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The formulation and articulation of national ideologies has been a characteristic of newly developed countries throughout the world. These ideologies have been found to-be useful tools to legitimatize new regimes, set and emotionalize national goals and obtain or maintain political power. The last emphasis has been particularly important in Southeast Asia as exemplified by "Guided Demo~racy'~' in Indonesia, "Personalism" in South Viet Wam and, more recently, "The Burmese Way to Socialism" in Burma. In fact, all three of these factors would appear to have been present in the Burmese case.
On April 30, 1962 the Revolutionary Council of the military-led government of Burma announced a new national ideology and plan of action termed "The Burmese Way to Socialism.'' This proclamation was both the culmination of army efforts to formulate an ideology which would consolidate and lead the people and a factor which \+-as to foster serious splits in the already shaken party structure. Both of these facets of the action of the Revolutionarj~ Council (RC) are worth consideration.
No purely military leadership in Southeast Asia has made such great efforts in the ideological field. This can partially be explained by the ideological context of some of the rebellions which ha^-e faced the u government over the past fifteen )ears, the backgrounds of a nuinber of the more influential colonels and. finally, by the tendency in Burma to present problems in ideological terms. A militarj-formed ideological platfornl was initially publicly articulated in 1958 at about the time of the first coup against the U Nu government. although this had been considered at an earlier conference of coinmanding officers held in 1956. The statement made at the Defense Services Conference in 1958 previewed in somewhat less Marxian tones the "Burmese Waj-to Socialism" (BWS) of 1962.
Man's endeaxour to build a society set free at last from anxieties over food. clothing and shelter, and able to enjoy life's spiritual satisfactions as well, fully convinced of the sanctity, dignity and essential goodness of life, must proceed from the premise of a faith only in a politico-economic system based on the eternal principles of justice, liberty and equality. This is our belief. . . .'
According to official military doctrine this was part of an ideological dexelopment process 1%-hich had proceeded as follows: This ideological development \+-as somewhat more confused than the military would care to admit, particularly during the period of the first Caretaker Goxernment (1958 Goxernment ( -1960 and immediately after the return of U Nu in April 1960. Differences of opinion were apparent on the major questions of the role of the military in a civilian led government and as to whether a civilian administration could fulfill the Defense Services' desire for unity and economic and social progress. Politically, they experimented with the idea of a multi-party parliamentary system with independents holding the balance, rather than the single ideological party proposed after the second coup. In the religious field attempts \+--ere made to use Burma's various faiths as a tool against communism. Efforts were also initiated to make the Constitution a base for the nation's ideology. None of these activities was very successful.
The period between the txro military governments (April 1960 -March 1962 was apparently one of considerable shifting and re-thinking within the officer corps. A number of officers retired or were shunted off to diplomatic posts overseas. There were also reports that officers with proWestern and sectarian views had been displaced from positions of influence during this period. Hopes. admittedly slight, that U Nu had "learned his lesson" and \vould be a more efficient administrator and inaintain domestic unity were damaged by a number of incidents. Unity in particular appeared to he a rather frail vessel in the hands of the Nu government as his own party split, ethnic groups appeared to he acquiring more autonomy and the establishment of the Buddhist State intensified religious antagonisms.
Thus, when the army did return, it displayed a shifted emphasis in ideology although in elery case previous ideological foundations were exident. The difference was ~r i m a r i l y a hardening of tone and position, a heightened nationalism, puritanism and emphasis on socialism and unity. Superficial signs could be seen in the promised elimination of various American and British educational agencies, beauty contests, horseracing, etc. The impact of Marxist thinking became readily apparent two months after the second coup with the publication of the "Burmese Way to S~cialism."~ The primary goal affirmed by the Revolutionary Council statement was socialism, based on a socialist economy which is described as "the planned, proportional development of all the national productive forces." Specifically, the nationalization of "vital" means of production such as industrial and agricultural production and distribution. transportation and commodities; work according to one's abilities and pay according to quality and quantity; a reasonable closing of income gaps and the recognition of workers and peasants as the vailguald and custodian of the "Socialist Democratic Staie" (hut with the acceptance of loyal middle strata). Politically, the document noted that parliamentary democracy had failed in Burma due to its "defects, weaknesses and loopholes, its abuses and the absence of a mature public opinion." Thus, "the nation's socialist aims cannot be achieved with any assurance by means of the form of Parliamentary Democracy that we have so far experienced." To achieve the "Burmese Way to Socialism" the RC called for education, an end to fraudulent politics, the prevention of "parisitism," reform of the bureaucratic machinery, modernization of agriculture, help to industries compatible with national resources and the formation of mass and class organizations. Science in education was stressed. Just as the old parties feared the document's implicatioils to party government, the traditionalist religious community could take little comfort in the words of the KC. Toleration of all religions, olxious demands that education be based on more secular values and attacks on "hypocritical religiosity" were all signs of a secular approach within the military. Later efforts were made to assuage the feelings of religious groups when a inember of the Revolutionary Council stated that the "Burmese Way" was in accord with the principles of Buddhism.
Looking at the pattern of this vaguely i\orded document, it used more Marxiall terminology than previous militai y pronouncements and was more vigorous in its attacks on the failures of parliameiltary democracy as a system applicable to Burma. Finally, it was developed within the nationalistic context of the new army group's ideology. As that indefatigable commentator on Burma's problen~s, Dr. Ba Maw, noted, "It is also Burmese; it wants socialism, which is good, but it wants it in a Burmese form and in the Burmese way, which is better still."" As matters developed, discussioils over the "Burmese Way to Socialisn~" centered upon two issues, the social and econonlic ideology of the socialist system expounded by the military and the political means of implementing that system. There was almost no argument on the socialist program put As has so often been true in Burma, it was not the oratory but its implementation which brought division and confusion. What worried party leaders in the AFPFL, Pyidaungsu Party and minority organizations was the attack on the parlianlentary system found in the "Burmese Way to Socialisnl." General Ne Will did nothing to disabuse them of these fears when in a press conference a week later he asserted that "parliamentary denlocracy contains too many loopholes for abuse to be of value to a country like Burma." Also inherent in the army plan appeared to be the establishment of a single party to lead the country toivard socialisin and this, colribined with the fulminations against parliamentary democracy, brought criticisms from leaders of almost all parties except the extreme left. It also caused crises within these parties as factions argued over the acceptance of the a r x y position.
The AFPFI, was the most articulate voice for parlia~llentary multi-party rule probably because the former ruling party, the Pyidaungsu, found its leadership still in detention. Soon after the military proclaimed its views, the AFPFL elite under U B3. Swe and U Kyaw Nyein called for the maintenance of clen~ocratic priilciples ancl the holding of free elections. The major objections centered oil the possible establishment of one-party rule under the aegis of the aimy. While supporting the militarj's socialist program and accepting Ne Win as Burma's national leader, the AFPFL executives warned that the army prograili could lead to Fascist or Cominu-. .
nist dictatorships and that although not as eficient, a multi-party system was the best way to achieve socialisnl. These arguments were expressed largely in moral terins although obviously the AFPFE also feared the loss of power which might ensue in a large party. It was particularly against rvorking with the leftist NUF, especially in a situation in which the NUF appeared to be on intimate terms with members of the ruling Revolutionary Council. The AFPFL was not able to maintain its disassociation with the one-party system without splits in its own ranks, however, and there were reports of divisions between the top leadership and second line leaders. Some of the latter desired to accept fully all facets of the "Burmese Way to Socialism." This positioll was particularly strong in Tenasserim where the dissidents were led by AFPFL leader, U Thein Maung of Thaton. U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein met with various divisions of the party in an effort to shore up possible weak spots, while U Thein nlaung also travelled in the districts in support of the RC plan. When unsuccessful in gaining his full loyalty, the AFPFL expelled U Thein Maung who was followed out of the party by the Zloulnlein and Thaton divisions.
The AFPFL was not the only organization to advocate a multi-party system for Burma. The &Ion National Front, fearing that minorities would be "forgotten," would not entertain the idea of a one-party system. The Pyidaungsu Party leadership, decimated by arrests, also found the oneparty system unappealing, although members of its allied organizations, the Union Labour Orgailization (ULO) and the All Burma Peasants Organization strongly supported the views of the military. The ULO itself split when the Rangoon branch dissolved itself in favor of the army and the Rlandalay and other branches remained intact.
On the other hand, the extreme left, particularly the Peoples' Comrades Party, Peoples' Progressive Party and Burma Workers' Party initially applauded the policies of the military, objecting only that the "Burmese Way to Socialism" did not go far enough toward the principles of MarxistLeninism and that the army method of obtaining power was objectionable.
In fact, in the early days of military rule the united front NUF was the major supporter of the new ideology and reportedly was in position to give advice to nlenlbers of the Revolutionary Council. However, even in the NUF the new ideology brought the estrangement of groups and individuals. These tensions were later to bring the expulsion of the All-Burma Karen Organization from the NUF 011 the basis that the former could not accept the "Burmese Way to Socialism."
A new element was introduced into this discourse in early July when the Revolutionary Council, unable to obtain sufficient support for a single united party, presented its plan for a cadre party organization, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSP, also called the Burmese Way to Socialism Party or EWS). The Constitutioil of the BSP"~rovides for a "transitional Party" leading to a mass party based 011 cleillocratic centralism. It "performs such basic party functions as recruiting nucleus personnel called cadres, and trailling and testing them by assigning duties, etc." In time this party is supposed to take over the duties of the KC in leading the way to a socialist ideology. The cadre party, as envisioned, provides for indiviclual membership, a very tight code of discipline including provisions relating to factionalism, conflicts of interest, individual income, gifts, secrets and disciplinary action, demancls up011 members for acquiring l<no~~ledge, self-criticism and acceptance of the "Eurmese V a y to Socialism." The ESP is to be the vanguard for a mass party of the future but presently is essentially under the control of the Revolutionary Council, with top positions held by members of the military.
'Union of Burma, The Colzstitution o/ the Burma Socialist P~.ogram,ne Party, 1962. The initial reaction of the various parties was caution, followed by a general acceptance of the view that individual members could join the BSP. Arguing that the heavy burdens of membership in the cadre party precluded dual membership, most party leaders felt that members who joined the BSP should resign from their parent organizations. This position was P U~forward in the Pyidaungsu Party, All-Burma Peasant's Organization, Burma Workers' Party and AFPFL. As the Secretary-General of the Pyidaungsu Party put it, members "cannot serve two masters at the same time," a statement in the mouths of others that masked deteriorating relations between those who joined the BSP and those who remained in the old parties. There was also considerable discussion of dissolving the political parties and entering wholesale into the new cadre organization, l~u t the older parties considered this action most precipitous.
Among the first to join the new cadre party was Thakin KJ-aw Dun, Secretary-General of the Pyidaungsu, followed by other leaders from that party plus personnel from Kachin and Karen organizations, the AFPFL and sections of the NUF. The majority of the major party organizations' leadership remained with their executive committees. A variety of reasons, articulated and unarticulated, were apparent, including an unwillingness to work within the strict disciplinary code of the BSP, a conflict of interest due to business commitments, disagreements with the military over definitions of socialism, a fear of losing hard-won positions in the older parties and a fear of being dominated by the military.
The future of party relationships in Burma remains cloudy. In spite of continuing party support for the military regime's policies, tensions are bound to exist between members of the older party organizations and the 1 1 e~~ military sponsored organization. Soon after the founding of the BSP twenty-six former old-line party members that had entered the cadre party accused their former c;mrades of possible future combinations against the BSP. Leaders of the AFPFL, NUF and Pyidaungsu Party immediately rejoined that the statement was inaccurate and, in the words of U Kpa~v Nyein of the AFPFL, You must remember that before leaving their mother parties, these men had done their best to discredit them. What else could they do than to try to ingratiate themselves with the Revolutionary Coui~cil.~ The bitterness of the comnlents made at this time does not augur well for -close cooperation between the new-and the old. Party officials see in the BSP a major danger to former patterns of power and tend to look on defectors as opportunists. Nor does the history of past army efforts at political organization give the military much reason for optimism.
During the last coup the military organized a non-partisan National Solidarity Association (NSA) as a mass citizens7 organization to encourage mass participation in government. It was not entirely successful and at Nation. (Rangoon), August 22, 1962, the time of Nu's return was remoulded into a cadre organization. This is not to state that a similar future awaits the BSP, but the same obstacles remain in the general apathy of the masses and the opposition of Burma's major political parties.
So far, the "Burmese Way to Socialism" has not been outstandingly successful in achieving any of the three aforementioned goals of new national icleologies. Instead, it has discovered the dissension and obstacles normal to attemuts to concretize and implement vague slogans.
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